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In its most general description, the capability approach is a flexible and multi-purpose 
normative framework, rather than a precise theory of well-being, freedom or justice. 
At its core are two normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-
being is of primary moral importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being 
is to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to 
do and be what they have reason to value. This framework can be used for a range of 
evaluative exercises, including most prominent the following: (1) the assessment of 
individual well-being; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social arrangements, 
including assessments of social and distributive justice; and (3) the design of policies 
and proposals about social change in society. In all these normative endeavors, the 
capability approach prioritizes (a selection of) peoples’ beings and doings and their 
opportunities to realize those beings and doings (such as their genuine opportunities 
to be educated, their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive social 
relationships). This stands in contrast to other accounts of well-being, which focus 
exclusively on subjective categories (such as happiness) or on the means to well-
being (such as resources like income or wealth).  
This article will be limited to the capability approach to justice, which is the area 
within political philosophy where the capability approach is the furthest developed 
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and has up to now made most impact. Yet it is instructive to note that there are other 
debates in social and political philosophy where the capability approach has played a 
role, such as providing a metric for an all-things-considered evaluation of institutions 
(Claassen 2009), or as the basis to conceptualize education (Robeyns 2006). 
This article will address the following main question. First, which metric of justice 
does the capability approach defend, and how does that compare with other metrics of 
justice? Second, has the capability approach succeeded in providing an alternative for 
John Rawls’s theory of ‘Justice as Fairness’? Third, which are the capabilities that are 
relevant for questions of justice? Fourth, since the capability approach endorses a 
multidimensional metric of justice, how should these dimensions be aggregated to 
come to an overall judgment, or are there ways to circumvent the need for 
aggregation? Finally, which other theoretical ‘modules’ need to be added to the metric 
of justice for a complete capability theory of justice? 
1. Capabilities as a metric of justice 
A theory of distributive justice can be compared with an engine, in which the 
capability approach provides only one part, or ‘module’ (Arneson 2010: 103). Not all 
theories of justice have exactly the same modules, yet theories of distributive justice 
must specify at least two things: a metric and a distributive rule (Anderson 2010: 81). 
The ‘metric of justice’ (also called ‘the currency of justice’) is the good that is to be 
compared between individuals when making statements of distributive injustices, 
hence the dimensions in which the interpersonal comparisons that are an integral part 
of claims of justice are made. The distributive rule specifies what justice requires in 
terms of the distribution of that good between people. Typical distributive rules are 
equality, sufficiency (minima that everyone should be situated above), or priority to 
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the worst off.  Moreover, there are other modules to the full theory of distributive 
justice, such as the grounds for its principles of justice, or a specification of the duties 
of justice rather than merely the rights of justice (see section 5). As Arneson (2010: 
103-104) point outs, one of the theoretical difficulties of comparing the capability 
approach to justice with other theories is that one limits the comparison to only one 
module, whereas the comparison really requires an assessment of the entire engine. 
We can’t make an overall comparison of, say, cars, by only comparing their wheels or 
their maximum speed. Thus, while some political philosophers mistakenly think the 
capability approach is a theory of equality or a theory of justice, the capability 
approach only specifies a metric of justice, and hence a variety of capability theories 
are possible, depending on the other modules that are integrated.  
Capability theories of justice argue that when making those interpersonal comparisons 
needed for justice, we should focus on peoples functionings and capabilities. 
Functionings are ‘beings and doings’, that is, various states of human beings and 
activities that a person can undertake. Examples of the former (the ‘beings’) are being 
well-nourished, being undernourished, being housed in a pleasantly warm but not 
excessively hot house, being educated, being illiterate, being part of a supportive 
social network, being part of a criminal network, and being depressed. Examples of 
the second group of functionings (the ‘doings’) are travelling, caring for a child, 
voting in an election, taking part in a debate, taking drugs, killing animals, eating 
animals, consuming lots of fuel in order to heat one’s house, and donating money to 
charity. To every functioning corresponds a capability, being the real opportunity one 
has to achieve that functioning. If we say that person A has a capability to functioning 
X, we are saying that if A chooses to (be or do) X, then A will succeed in (doing or 
being) X. 
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What reasons are there to focus on the evaluative space of functionings and 
capabilities, rather than other possible metrics of justice, such as Rawlsian primary 
goods or happiness? The capability approach holds that judgments of justice should 
focus on what really matters to people, which is their freedom to achieve well-being. 
Thus, we should focus on the ends rather than the means of well-being, and the 
capability approach postulates that these ends are what people are able to be and to 
do, rather than their happiness.  
The capability approach argues against subjective metrics of justice on at least two 
grounds (Anderson 2010: 85-87). First, subjective metrics are sensitive to problems of 
adaptation, that is, the problem that people adapt their subjective well-being to their 
deprived circumstances or oppressive social norms. The opposite kind of adaptation, 
whereby one gets used to high levels of affluence or the privileges caused by social 
hierarchies, is possible too – a phenomenon known as ‘expensive tastes’ in theories of 
equality and justice (Dworkin 1981a: pagenumbers).  
Arguments against subjective metrics of justice could be used to motivate a shift to 
resources, seen as the means of justice, as has been done in the theories of justice 
defended by John Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin (1981a,b). Yet the problem with 
shifting to means is that people differ in their ability to convert means into valuable 
opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functionings) (Sen 1992: 26-28, 36-38). 
Since ends are what ultimately matters when thinking about well-being and the 
quality of life, means can only work as reliable proxies of people’s opportunities to 
achieve those ends if all people have the same capacities or powers to convert those 
means into equal capability sets. Capability scholars believe that these inter-individual 
differences are far-reaching and significant, and that theories that focus on means tend 
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to downplay their normative relevance. The sources of inter-individual differences to 
convert means into ends can be personal (e.g. impairments), social (e.g. social norms) 
or environmental (e.g. living in an area affected by malaria). 
2. Capabilities versus social primary goods  
Of all the possible metrics of justice, philosophers defending the capability approach 
have most explicitly targeted John Rawls’s metric of justice, the ‘social primary 
goods’ (Nussbaum 2006; Sen 1980, 2009). In his 1979 Tanner lecture entitled 
‘Equality of What?’, Sen (1980) argued that “the primary goods approach seems to 
take little note of the diversity of human beings. … If people were basically very 
similar, then an index of primary goods might be quite a good way of judging 
advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have very different needs varying with health, 
longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, temperament, and even 
body size. … So what is being involved is not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but 
overlooking very widespread and real differences” (Sen 1980: 215-216). A person 
with a disability, however severe, would not have a claim to additional resources 
grounded in his impairment under Rawls’s two principles of justice.  Sen argues that 
Rawls’s difference principle would not justify any redistribution to the disabled on 
grounds of disability. Rawls’s strategy has been to postpone the question of our 
obligations towards the disabled, and exclude them from the scope of his theory. 
Rawls certainly does not want to deny our moral duties towards the people that fall 
outside the scope of his theory, but he thinks that we should first work out a robust 
and convincing theory of justice for the “normal” cases and only then try to extend it 
to the “more extreme cases” (Rawls 2001: 176).  
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Sen’s critique in his Tanner lecture, however, was not only about the case of the 
severely disabled. Sen’s more general critique concerned what he saw as the 
inflexibility of primary goods as a metric of justice. Sen believes that the more 
general problem with the use of primary goods is that it cannot adequately deal with 
the pervasive inter-individual differences between people. Primary goods, he argues, 
cannot adequately account for differences among individuals in their abilities to 
convert these primary goods into what people are able to be and to do in their lives. 
Primary goods are among the valuable means to pursue one’s life plan. But the real 
opportunities or possibilities that a person has to pursue her own life plan, are not 
only influenced by the primary goods that she has at her disposal, but also by a range 
of factors that determine to what extent she can use these primary goods to generate 
valuable states of being and doing. Hence, Sen claims that we should focus on the 
extent of substantive freedom that a person effectively has, i.e. her capabilities. 
Yet Rawls has defended the exclusion of the disabled from his theory. Rawls stressed, 
especially in his later work, that in his theory “everyone has physical needs and 
psychological capacities within the normal range”, and therefore he excludes people 
with severe physical or mental disabilities from the scope of justice as fairness (2001: 
170-176). In his earlier work (Rawls 1971), Rawls justified the restriction by arguing 
that a theory of justice should in any case apply for ‘normal cases’ – if the theory is 
inconsistent or implausible for such cases, then it will certainly not be an attractive 
theory for the more challenging cases, such as people with severe disabilities. We 
could postpone the question of how to treat people with disabilities to one of the later 
(legislative) stages of the design of the basic structure of society, though, of course, 
even in his earliest discussions of this Rawls thinks that the final theory of justice 
must deal adequately with the claims of people whose abilities fall outside the normal 
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range, and that any theory that cannot do so should be rejected on those grounds. In 
later work Rawls (2001: 176) no longer argued that the case of justice towards the 
disabled had to be postponed to the legislative phase, but rather that we had to try to 
extend justice as fairness to include those cases. Rawls has not pursued this task 
systematically himself, though he has emphasized the role that his conception of the 
person possessed of the capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of the good 
plays in justice, and has argued  (2001: 176-178) that this conception enables him to 
deflect accusations of “fetishism” about the primary goods. 
A more recent wave of philosophical enquiry has highlighted how complex the 
comparisons between Rawls’s theory of justice and the capability view are (Pogge 
2002; Robeyns 2009; Brighouse and Robeyns 2010).  One reason is that the capability 
metric is a general metric of well-being freedom, whereas the social primary goods 
metric emerges as one element of an integral and complex theory of political justice 
(rather than social justice more broadly, let alone the even wider category of moral 
evaluations). Also, Rawls’s theory of justice is an ideal theory of justice since it tries 
to outline the conditions of a completely just utopia, which the capability does nto 
aspire to do. This means that it is very hard to compare Rawls’s work on justice with 
the philosophical work on the capability approach, since their scope and theoretical 
aims are not the same (Robeyns 2009, 2011). 
Regarding scope, Rawls’s theory of justice is limited in scope to (1) the basic 
structure of society (that is, the set of most important social institutions), (2) to liberal 
democratic societies rather than also to nondemocratic and illiberal societies, (3) and 
to the principles of justice insofar as they apply to people in their capacity as citizens. 
The scope of the capability approach can be summarized as “justice applies 
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everywhere” – that is, it applies to all human beings independently of their country of 
birth or residence, and not only to social institutions but also to the social ethos and to 
social practices.  
Regarding theoretical aims, one can safely say that most capability scholars tend to 
disfavor top-down theorizing, and prefer to find out how theory or philosophy can 
help us make the actual world, a social institution or a practice more just, rather then 
to work more abstractly on the principles of justice and their justification. This last 
difference has been a main point of attention in Sen’s more recent work (Sen 2009).  
Rawlsians have criticized the capability approach too, and not all of their critiques 
have been sufficiently rebutted (Pogge 2002; Kelly 2010).  
Firstly, the capability approach is claimed to be endorsing a particular comprehensive 
moral view, which Rawlsians find objectionable. Rawls aims to stay away from a 
perfectionist account of justice, and the question is whether this is possible for a 
capability theory of justice. This is an important area of dispute, to which we will 
return briefly in section 3.  
Another main Rawlsian objection to the capability approach concerns the publicity 
criterion, which stipulates that the conception of justice must be public and the 
necessary information to make a claim of injustice must be verifiable by all, and 
easily accessible. Rawlsians argue that a theory of justice needs a public standard of 
interpersonal comparisons, as otherwise the obtained principles of justice among 
citizens with diverse conceptions of the good life will not prove stable. The 
suggestion is that as capabilities are very hard to measure or assess in such a public 
fashion, and as they would require very large amounts and difficult sorts of 
information, the capability approach is unworkable as a theory of justice.  Clearly, not 
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everyone would agree that this is valid complaint. For example, Elizabeth Anderson 
(2010: 85) has argued that the capabilities metric does meet the publicity criterion, 
while Richard Arneson (2010: 114) has argued that concerns of justice overrule 
concerns of publicity: if social justice can only be achieved by relying on measures 
that violate the publicity criterion, then that is a price worth paying. Finally, it has 
also been questioned whether the social primary goods metric, which prominently 
includes opportunities, can itself meet the publicity requirement, in which case the 
publicity critique would lose much of its force (Robeyns 2009: 409).  
3. Which are the capabilities relevant for justice? 
A major challenge for a capability theory of justice is the question which capabilities 
matter. In answering this question, philosophers have had two different notions of 
justice in mind. One sees the question of justice as a question about truth, sharply 
distinguished from questions about implementation, justice-enhancing policies, 
feasibility, and other practical concerns. G.A. Cohen (2008) is an important 
representative of this line of work. However, very few articles analyzing or defending 
the capability approach to justice take this line. An exception is Peter Vallentyne 
(2005), who argues that all functionings should be included when considering issues 
of justice. According to Vallentyne (2005: 362), “given that any functioning could, 
under some circumstances, enhance (or otherwise affect) the quality of someone’s 
life, it is a mistake to exclude some functionings from consideration. To do so would 
leave out something that is relevant for justice.” However, Vallentyne adds that this is 
not to deny that when designing policies, we need to select the most important 
capabilities. Since virtually all capability theorists implicitly or explicitly understand 
‘justice’ as a practical concept, that is, as a concept that will help us in telling what we 
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ought to do or how we ought to shape social institutions, they take some (minimal) 
feasibility constraints into account. Those working in a more practical line of political 
philosophy have argued that considerations of justice require that we demarcate 
morally relevant from morally irrelevant and morally bad capabilities (Nussbaum 
2003; Pogge 2002; Pierik and Robeyns 2007). Put differently, any capability account 
of justice will have to tell us which capabilities are relevant and which are not for 
purposes of justice.  
Amartya Sen (2004, 2009: 242-243) notoriously has refused to answer this question, 
claiming that processes of public reasons and democratic deliberation should lead to 
the selection of relevant capabilities. Yet this ‘democratic route’ to selecting the 
relevant capabilities requires a specific account of the deliberative processes that are 
needed, and that specific account has not been provided by Sen. While several 
capability theorists have debated issues of democratic deliberation in the context of 
development questions or other policy decisions, within the context of distributive 
justice this work remains to be done.  
The second way to select the relevant capabilities for the purpose of justice is the 
‘criteria route’, whereby the criteria that the selected capabilities should meet are 
proposed and defended. A prominent example of the ‘criteria route’ is Elizabeth 
Anderson’s (1999) theory of democratic equality. Anderson (1999: 316), who aims to 
develop the outline of a political theory of justice (rather than a theory of social 
justice that encompasses all spheres of life), argues that people should be entitled “to 
whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in 
oppressive social relationships” and “to the capabilities necessary for functioning as 
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an equal citizen in a democratic state”, without giving a complete list of which 
capabilities are meeting these criteria.  
The third way to select the relevant capabilities for the purpose of justice is the 
‘objective-list route’. Following Derek Parfit’s notion of objective list theories, being 
theories claiming that “certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want 
to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things” (Parfit 1984: 493), the capability 
theorist proposes an objective list of well-being which will be the concern of 
distributive justice. Richard Arneson (2010) defends this version of the capability 
approach, which he dubs the ‘perfectionist capability theory’ – without, however, 
specifying an account of well-being in terms of an objective list.  
Martha Nussbaum’s (2000, 2006, 2011) minimal theory of justice is the most well-
known version of the capabilities approach which relies on an objective list of well-
being. Nussbaum’s theory of social justice is comprehensive, in the sense that it is not 
limited to an account of political justice, or to liberal democracies. Rather, her 
account holds for all human beings on earth, independently of whether they are living 
in a liberal democratic regime, or of whether they are severely disabled. The main 
demarcation of Nussbaum’s account is that it provides only “a partial and minimal 
account of social justice” (Nussbaum 2006: 71) by specifying thresholds of a list of 
capabilities that governments in all nations should guarantee to their citizens. 
Nussbaum’s theory focuses on thresholds, but this does not imply that reaching these 
thresholds is all that matters for social justice; rather, her theory is partial and simply 
leaves unaddressed the question what social justice requires once those thresholds are 
met. Nussbaum’s well-known list contains capabilities that are grouped together 
under ten “central human capabilities”: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
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imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2006: 76-78; 2011: 33-34). 
Nussbaum (2000: 70-77; 2006: 78-81) justifies her list by arguing that each of these 
capabilities is needed in order for a human life to be “not so impoverished that it is 
not worthy of the dignity of a human being” (2000: 72). She defends these capabilities 
as being the moral entitlements of every human being on earth. She formulates the list 
at an abstract level and advocates that the translation to implementation and policies 
should be done at a local level, taking into account local differences. Nussbaum 
argues that this list can be derived from a Rawlsian overlapping consensus and 
stresses that her list remains open-ended and always open for revision (Nussbaum 
2000: 77), yet other philosophers have taken issue with her claim that this would 
result in a form of political liberalism, claiming that she is a perfectionist liberal after 
all (Barclay 2003). 
4. Aggregating capabilities 
The selection of relevant capabilities is one major challenge for the capability 
approach to justice, yet another is the question how to aggregate the different 
capabilities that are judged to be relevant for issues of justice. If judgments of justice 
require us to make interpersonal comparisons of people’s overall freedom to achieve 
well-being, don’t we need a way to aggregate the value of the different capabilities 
into an overall value? 
In many cases, this will be true. Yet the literature capability-justice is remarkably 
silent on this question. There are some proposals for aggregating capabilities either 
using social choice procedures (Chakraborty 1996) or else equating the value of a 
capability by its contribution to a person’s happiness (Schokkaert 2007), but these are 
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made in the context of welfare economics, rather than as part of an attempt to 
assessing justice. Amartya Sen deliberately refuses to investigate the question how 
such aggregation should or could be done, since he believes that striving for complete 
rankings is a mistake (Sen 2009).  
The capability literature thus seems to leave us with empty hands. Yet the problem of 
aggregating the dimensions of the metric of justice is of course relevant for all 
multidimensional metrics of justice, including Rawls’s social primary goods metric, 
or Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism. Could the capability approach borrow the 
aggregation mechanisms available in Dworkin’s or Rawls’s theory? 
On one interpretation of Rawls, the aggregation problems is an unsolved problem in 
his theory of justice, since the social primary goods are noncommensurable. On 
another interpretation, the social primary goods of basic liberties, opportunities and 
the social basis of self-respect, will be distributed equality if Rawls’s first principle of 
justice (the principle of equal liberties) is met, implying that for distributive questions 
the relevant social primary goods reduce to income and wealth.  If one finds this 
reduction of the full range of social primary goods for questions of distributive justice 
to only income and wealth problematic, then there is no satisfactory solution to the 
aggregation problem in Rawls’s theory of justice either. So the problem of 
aggregating would then be a problem for the capability approach to justice, but as 
well to the social primary goods metric.  
Dworkin (1981b) proposes the so-called ‘envy-test’ to make comparisons between the 
‘resources’ that people hold, which in Dworkin’s conceptualization includes not only 
their material possessions and leisure time, but also their skills, talents and handicaps. 
If one is willing to take a pill to trade with the place of another person, taking the 
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entire ‘package deal’ of their life, one has a justified complaint that one has not 
received one’s fair share in life. Yet while Dworkin’s envy test may be a useful 
heuristic device, the envy test entails impossible epistemological requirements, and 
operates against a number of background assumptions that make Dworkin’s theory 
highly idealized (Pierik and Robeyns 2007). Moreover, while it may be a useful 
device in micro-situations or for thought experiments, it offers little to political 
leaders or policy makers who cannot make these envy tests on behalf of all the 
citizens. Still, the point which capability theorists of justice should take home is that 
something like a Dworkinian envy test will have to be developed if one wants the 
capability metric to do the work of a complete theory of distributive justice. 
A capability theory of justice that endorses sufficiency as the distributive rule, such as 
Martha Nussbaum’s theory (2000, 2006, 2011) can avoid the problem of aggregation, 
since such theory specifies that justice requires only that all people meet a certain 
threshold-level for each capability. Yet even such a theory has two major problems to 
solve. First, we will need to know where the thresholds are set, or which person or 
which foundational principles decides on the thresholds; basically, the normative 
decisions that confront the selection of relevant capabilities re-emerge here, albeit in a 
slightly different guise. Secondly, in an unjust world, the theory of transitional justice 
or the non-ideal theory of justice will need to tell us which capability to prioritize if 
not all people are above the thresholds of all relevant capabilities. Should we 
prioritize education, health, or being able to hold a decent job? Nussbaum (2011: 37-
38) has argued that the impossibility to get all people above the thresholds for all 
capabilities involves a tragic choice, which should prompt us to ask the question how 
we can work towards a future where this is no longer the case. For Nussbaum, this 
strategy will be sufficient, since “If the whole list has been wisely crafted and the 
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thresholds set at a reasonable level, there usually will be some answer to that 
question.” (Nussbaum 2011: 38)  Yet one could wonder whether this response does 
solve the problem: many of the one billion most deprived people on Earth are below 
reasonable thresholds on most of the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. Which one 
should a justice-seeking organization or government prioritize?  
5. A family of capability theories of justice 
The capability approach is often wrongly taken to be an egalitarian theory or a theory 
of social or distributive justice, yet its core doesn’t entail more then the two normative 
propositions stated at the beginning of this article. The capability approach specifies 
what should count for interpersonal evaluations and thus provides one important 
aspect (or ‘module’) of a theory of social or distributive justice, yet more is needed 
before one can speak of a theory of justice (Robeyns 2011). 
Nussbaum (2000, 2006, 2011) offers us a capability theory of justice, but her theory 
too doesn’t amount to a full theory of social justice. Moreover, it would be a mistake 
to think that there can be only one capability theory of justice; on the contrary, the 
open nature of the capability approach allows for the development of a family of 
capability theories of justice. But this prompts the question: what is needed to develop 
a full capability theory of justice, and which of these aspects have already been 
developed by capability theorists? Assuming that the capability theory of justice has 
addressed the issues outlined above – that is, the selection of the relevant capabilities, 
and the question of aggregation – another number of theoretical choices remain to be 
made and defended.  
First, a theory of justice needs to explain on what basis it justifies its principles or 
claims of justice. For example, in Rawls’s theory of justice the two principles of 
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justice are justified by the thought-experiment of the original position and the more 
general social contract framework on which this is based. Dworkin’s egalitarian 
justice theory starts from the meta-principle of equal respect and concern, which he 
then develops in the principles that the distribution of burdens and benefits should be 
sensitive to the ambitions that people have but should not reflect the unequal natural 
endowments with which individuals are born. One could also develop a capability 
theory of justice arguing that the ultimate driving force is a concern with autonomy or 
with human dignity, or with human vulnerability, or with a combination of these. If 
capability scholars want to develop a full theory of justice, they will also need to 
explain on what bases they will justify their principles or claims. As mentioned 
earlier, Nussbaum starts from a notion of human dignity, whereas the Senian strand in 
the capability approach stresses the importance of what people have reason to value, 
hence an account of public reasoning. However, little work has been done so far to 
flesh out this embryonic idea of ‘having reason to value’, and it therefore remains 
unclear whether the capability approach has a solid unified rationale on the basis of 
which a full account of justice could be developed.  
Second, a capability theory of justice needs to take a position on the ‘distributive rule’ 
that it will endorse: will it argue for plain equality, or for sufficiency, or for 
prioritarianism, or for some other (mixed) distributive rule? Both Martha Nussbaum’s 
and Elizabeth Andersons’s theories are sufficiency accounts (Anderson 1999, 2010; 
Nussbaum 2006), but from this it does not follow, as one sometimes reads in the 
secondary literature, that the capability approach entails a sufficiency rule. Sen may 
have given the (wrong) impression of defending straight equality as a distributive 
rule, by asking the question ‘Equality of what?’ (Sen 1980), though a careful reading 
shows that he was merely asking the question ‘If we want to be defending equality of 
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something, then what would that be?’ In fact, Sen has remained uncommitted to one 
single distributive rule, which probably can be explained by the fact that he is averse 
of building a well-defined theory of justice but rather prefers to investigate how real-
life unjust situations can be turned into more just situations, even if perfect justice is 
unattainable (Sen 2009). The capability approach clearly plays a role in Sen’s work 
on justice, since when assessing a situation he will investigate inequalities in people’s 
capabilities and analyze the processes that led to those inequalities. Yet Sen has an 
eclectic approach to theorizing, and hence other notions and theories (such as human 
rights or more formal analyses of freedoms from social choice theory) also play a role 
in his work on justice. The presence and importance of the capability approach in 
Sen’s work is thus undeniable, but should not be seen as the only defining feature.  
Third, when developing a capability theory of justice we must decide whether we 
want it to be an outcome or an opportunity theory, that is, whether we think that we 
should assess injustices in terms of functionings, or rather in terms of capabilities, or a 
mixture. At the level of theory and principles, most theorists of justice endorse the 
view that justice is done if all have equal genuine opportunities, or if all reach a 
minimal threshold of capability levels. Translated to the capability language, this 
would imply that at the level of theory and principles, capabilities are the relevant 
metric of justice, and not functionings. However while most theorists defend 
opportunities rather than outcomes, the focus on opportunities is not entirely 
uncontested (e.g. Fleurbaey 2002; Phillips, 2004; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). 
Fourth, a capability theory of justice needs to specify where the line between 
individual and collective responsibility is drawn, or how it will be decided, and by 
whom, where this line will be drawn. There is a remarkable absence of any discussion 
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about issues of responsibility in the capability literature, in sharp contrast to political 
philosophy and welfare economics where this is one of the most important lines of 
debate, certainly since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s (1981b) work on justice 
and equality which led to what Elizabeth Anderson (1999) has called ‘luck-
egalitarianism’. An exception is Peter Vallentyne (2005: 365), who has argued that 
the relevant metric of justice is ‘brute luck capabilities’, being the capabilities that one 
has a matter of brute luck only; those that one has as a matter of option luck (that is, 
due to one’s own choices) are not a concern of justice. While Vallentyne endorses a 
strict separation between theorizing about justice and policy and institutional design, 
the question of responsibility also has important effects for the more practical 
approach to justice. Indeed, whether one wants to discuss it explicitly or not, any 
concrete capability-based policy proposal can be analyzed in terms of the division 
between personal and collective responsibility; but this terminology is largely absent 
from the capability literature. There may be plausible explanations for why this issue 
is not discussed in the capability literature, but if a capability theory of justice wants 
to be applicable to questions of justice, then it cannot but confront the question about 
the just division between personal and collective responsibility (Pierik and Robeyns 
2007: 148-149). 
This brings us to a related issue: a theory of justice generally specifies rights, but also 
duties. However, capability theorists have remained largely silent on the questions 
who should bear the duties for the expansion of the selected capabilities.  Nussbaum 
passionately advocates that all people all over the world should be entitled, as a matter 
of justice, to threshold levels of all the capabilities on her list; but apart from 
mentioning that it is the governments’ duties to guarantee these entitlements (2006: 
70), she remains silent on the question who precisely should bear the burdens and 
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responsibilities for realizing these capabilities. Yet as Onora O’Neill (1996: chapter 5) 
has argued, questions of obligations and responsibilities should be central to any 
account of justice. 
This short and presumably incomplete list of the ‘modules’ which a complete 
capability theory of justice would need to entail, makes clear that a capability theory 
of justice is theoretically much more demanding than the basic presupposition of the 
capability approach to distributive justice, namely its claim that ‘functionings’ and 
‘capabilities’ are the best metric of justice. While much has been written on the 
capability approach in recent years, by an increasing number of scholars, including 
philosophers, much of the philosophical work needed for turning the open-ended 
capability approach into a specific theory of justice remains to be done. 
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